Strategic appraisal of environmental risks: a contrast between the UK’s Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change and its Committee on Radioactive Waste Management by Dietz, Simon & Morton, Alec
Strategic appraisal of environmental risks: a 
contrast between the UK’s Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change and its 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 
Simon Dietz and Alec Morton 
September 2009 
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy 
Working Paper No. 6 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and 
the Environment 
Working Paper No. 5 
 
The Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy (CCCEP) was established 
by the University of Leeds and the London School of Economics and Political 
Science in 2008 to advance public and private action on climate change through 
innovative, rigorous research. The Centre is funded by the UK Economic and Social 
Research Council and has five inter-linked research programmes: 
1. Developing climate science and economics 
2. Climate change governance for a new global deal 
3. Adaptation to climate change and human development 
4. Governments, markets and climate change mitigation 
5. The Munich Re Programme - Evaluating the economics of climate risks and 
opportunities in the insurance sector 
 
More information about the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy can be 
found at: http://www.cccep.ac.uk. 
 
 
The Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment was 
established by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2008 to 
bring together international expertise on economics, finance, geography, the 
environment, international development and political economy to create a world-
leading centre for policy-relevant research and training in climate change and the 
environment. The Institute is funded by the Grantham Foundation for the Protection 
of the Environment, and has five research programmes: 
1. Use of climate science in decision-making 
2. Mitigation of climate change (including the roles of carbon markets and low-
carbon technologies) 
3. Impacts of, and adaptation to, climate change, and its effects on development 
4. Governance of climate change 
5. Management of forests and ecosystems 
 
More information about the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment can be found at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/grantham. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This working paper is intended to stimulate discussion within the research community 
and among users of research, and its content may have been submitted for 
publication in academic journals. It has been reviewed by at least one internal referee 
before publication. The views expressed in this paper represent those of the 
author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders. 
 
 Strategic appraisal of environmental risks: a contrast 
between the UK’s Stern Review on the Economics of 
Climate Change and its Committee on Radioactive 
Waste Management 
 
Simon Dietz 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and 
Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and 
Political Science (LSE), Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK 
Contact details: e-mail: s.dietz@lse.ac.uk 
tel.: +44 (0) 207 955 7589 
 
Alec Morton 
Department of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE), Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK 
Contact details: e-mail: a.morton@lse.ac.uk 
tel.: +44 (0) 207 955 6537 
September 20091 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Ronan Palmer, Chief Economist at the Environment Agency, for the 
opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at the Environment Agency workshop 
on “Valuing Intangibles”, to the participants at that workshop for their feedback, and to 
Gordon MacKerron for a helpful discussion. We would also like to thank Michael Spackman, 
David Collier, Colin Foan and Pete Wilkinson for comments on the written paper. However, 
the views are the authors’, as is responsibility for any errors. SD would like to acknowledge 
the support of the Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment, as well as the 
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, which is funded by the UK’s Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) and by Munich Re. 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we compare two high-profile strategic policy reviews 
undertaken for the UK government on environmental risks: radioactive waste 
management and climate change. These reviews took very different forms, 
both in terms of analytic approach and deliberation strategy. The Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change was largely an exercise in expert 
modelling, building, within a cost-benefit framework, an argument for 
immediate reductions in carbon emissions. The Committee on Radioactive 
Waste Management, on the other hand, followed a much more explicitly 
deliberative and participative process, using Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 
to bring together scientific evidence and stakeholder and public values. In this 
paper we ask why the two reviews were different, and whether the 
differences are justified. We conclude that the differences were mainly due to 
political context, rather than the underpinning science, and as a consequence 
that, while in our view “fit for purpose”, they would both have been stronger 
had they been less different. Stern’s grappling with ethical issues could have 
been strengthened by a greater degree of public and stakeholder engagement, 
and CoRWM’s handling of issues of uncertainty could have been 
strengthened by the explicitly probabilistic framework of Stern. 
Keywords: Cost-Benefit Analysis; discounting; Multi-Criteria Decision 
Analysis; public engagement 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In late July 2006, the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 
(generally known as “CoRWM”), which was set up by the UK government in 
2003, published its recommendations in Managing our Radioactive Waste Safely 
(1, in chapter 9). CoRWM endorsed geological disposal as “the best available 
approach” in principle for the long-term management of the UK’s radioactive 
waste “within the present state of knowledge”. Just three months later, Sir 
Nicholas (now Lord) Stern presented his UK government-sponsored review 
of climate-change policy, The Economics of Climate Change (2). He recommended 
“prompt and strong action” worldwide to deal with climate change. Both of 
these were high-profile exercises in the strategic appraisal of environmental 
risks and yet they took strikingly different approaches. In this paper we ask 
why, and whether the differences are justified. Our overarching motivation 
for this paper is the improvement of decision making in the face of such 
environment risks, particularly in relation to the use of formal methods such 
as Cost Benefit or Decision Analysis. 
 
These strategic policy reviews are of interest as they provide a window on 
how government can approach the analysis of substantive environmental 
risks. Contrasting them, as we do in this paper, brings out the particular 
choices which government makes in framing, and which the reviewer or 
review team has in undertaking, such reviews. In this analysis we draw on 
documentary evidence, in particular the reports themselves, but also personal 
experience, as both the authors were involved in one or other of the reviews. 
The first author was a full-time member of the Stern Review team in the UK 
Treasury, and the second author was a member of the team of consultants that 
facilitated CoRWM’s Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis. Despite our personal 
involvement, we do nevertheless take a gently critical view, arguing that both 
of these reviews could profitably have drawn on some of the tools of the 
other. 
 
Both climate-change policy and radioactive waste management centrally 
involve risk and irreversibility. In the case of radioactive waste, the key 
decision is one of whether to emplace the waste in a permanent geological 
disposal facility or leave it in temporary storage. The argument for the former 
is that we can have sufficient confidence in the performance of a suitably 
designed and located facility to contain the waste, and in any case, no better 
solution is likely to become available in the foreseeable future; the argument 
for the latter is that this confidence is overstated, and we risk losing the 
flexibility to respond when new information arises. In the case of climate 
change, the key decision on emissions reductions is whether to take 
aggressive action now or postpone intervention to the future. The argument 
for taking action now is that anthropogenic climate change is irreversible, and 
we already have enough evidence that it is real, and at least potentially 
catastrophic. The counterargument is that investments to reduce emissions 
are also costly to reverse, that we are currently too uncertain about the 
benefits of such emissions reductions, and that we should wait until we have 
learned more about them. 
 
How best to approach policy problems involving decision under risk has been 
a source of contention for decades. In this paper we draw on the view 
articulated by Stern and Fineberg (3) that the process for handling such 
problems should generally be at least to a certain extent an “analytic-
deliberative” one (for clarity, we note that the Stern of Stern and Fineberg is 
not the Stern of the Stern Review). Drawing implicitly on the thought of 
Habermas, Stern and Fineberg present analysis and deliberation as distinct 
modes of approaching problems: 
 
We use the term analysis to refer to ways of building understanding 
by systematically applying specific theories and methods that have 
been developed within communities of expertise, such as those of 
the natural science, social science, engineering, decision science, 
logic, mathematics, and law [disciplines] (p 97). 
 
Deliberation is any formal or informal process for communication 
and for raising and collectively considering issues. In deliberation, 
people confer, ponder, exchange views, consider evidence, reflect 
on matters of mutual interest, and attempt to persuade each other 
(p73).  
 
Stern and Fineberg argue that these modes are mutually strengthening and 
that organisations concerned with risk-related decisions should acknowledge 
the relevance of analysis and deliberation and give conscious attention to how 
they are integrated. Stern and Fineberg also acknowledge that analysis and 
deliberation are often closely intertwined in existing practice (for example, 
academic peer review is a form of deliberation deployed within scientific 
disciplines): nevertheless, their synthesis provides a basis for good practice, 
and we see this current paper as amplifying their main themes in the context 
of the strategic policy review. 
 
There were striking differences between CoRWM and Stern both in the nature 
of the analytic techniques used (Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis versus a 
range of economic and probabilistic approaches to support Cost-Benefit 
Analysis), and also in the form which deliberation took (broad- versus 
narrow-based). We ask three central questions: 
a) How did the reviews’ approaches differ? 
b) What explanations can be given for why the reviews differed? 
c) Should the reviews have been less different, and what could they learn 
from each other? 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. To address question a), we outline the 
differences between the two reviews in Section 2. In Section 3, turning to 
question b), we note the choices of analytic approach and deliberative strategy 
were linked, and explore possible reasons for these differences, in terms of (i) 
the underpinning science, (ii) the scale of the problem and (iii) the political 
context of the reviews. The structure of these two sections is summarised in 
Figure 1. In Section 4, we give our answer to the difficult question c), and then 
in Section 5 we conclude. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
2. HOW DID THE REVIEWS’ APPROACHES DIFFER? 
 
On one level, CoRWM and Stern appear to have considerable similarities. 
Both were commissioned at the highest levels of government to report on a 
knotty problem. In both cases, the political sensitivity of the issue and its 
technical complexity generated a perceived need to commission senior figures 
with credible independence from the heart of government to lead the review. 
Both were similar in scope with budgets of a few million pounds sterling and 
lead-times to delivery of about two and a half and one and a half years 
respectively. Nevertheless, there were substantial differences (table I). In this 
section we focus on the differences in terms of analytic approach and 
deliberation strategy. 
 
Table I about here 
 
2.1. Analytic approach 
 
Both reviews drew on substantial bodies of scientific evidence, although the 
relevant scientific communities were obviously different: CoRWM had 
relatively little need to consult atmospheric scientists, just as Stern had for 
hydrogeologists. Similarly neither review was a research project in the 
underlying science – both broadly accepted the consensus view. Both drew on 
analytic approaches for integrating the scientific information, relating it to 
value-relevant outcomes, and ultimately trading-off conflicting desiderata. 
However, the approaches drawn on to do this were quite different – Multi-
Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) in the case of CoRWM and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA) in the case of Stern. 
 
CoRWM’s approach, while technically innovative in various ways, and 
unusually ambitious in scale, is recognisable as an MCDA of a type familiar in 
the context of environmental appraisal (e.g.4, 5-7). Roughly, CoRWM’s MCDA 
worked as follows. A long list of solutions was prepared, some of which were 
eliminated at an early stage to obtain a shortlist. At workshops attended 
predominantly by scientists and other experts, short-listed options were 
scored on a number of different criteria. These criteria were then weighted to 
arrive at overall value scores using a “swing weighting” elicitation procedure 
(8). A considerable amount of effort was invested in eliciting criteria weights 
from the public and stakeholders and in ensuring they were meaningful. The 
Committee members themselves deliberated over criteria weighting in a 
series of workshops or ‘Decision Conferences’ (9-11). Extensive sensitivity 
analysis was done to explore whether the recommended solutions were 
robust to reasonable changes in weights, on the basis of information garnered 
from the public and stakeholder engagement. CoRWM also made a holistic 
assessment of the solution options to tap into the Committee members’ 
overall, disaggregate feel for how the options performed. For further details 
the reader is referred to Chapters 10 and 11 of CoRWM’s report and Morton, 
Airoldi and Phillips (12). 
 
In Stern’s case, the review team followed the standard logic of CBA, 
comparing costs and benefits with the welfare-economic motivation of only 
recommending policies that increase some proxy of aggregate well-being (e.g. 
13). This conventionally involves measuring costs and benefits in money units 
wherever possible. The nature of this exercise places heavy emphasis on 
expert modelling, and distinguishes it from many MCDAs in the 
environmental domain, where the emphasis is on structuring the analysis 
around stakeholder engagement. Thus Stern built an argument for immediate 
and strong cutbacks in carbon emissions on the basis of a wide range of 
technical modelling exercises to quantify costs and benefits. 
 
In some academic circles, the extent to which Stern’s analysis can be 
considered an example of CBA has been debated (14-18). This appears to stem 
from the fact that Stern did not use a single so-called ‘integrated assessment 
model’ (see 19) to estimate the monetary costs and benefits of emissions 
reductions. Rather it made partial use of a variety of models, on the grounds 
that no single model could be considered adequate for all purposes (20). This 
precluded formal estimation of the ‘optimal’ target for global carbon 
emissions in welfare-economic terms, which would have been a natural task 
to undertake if a single model had been used (e.g. in 21, 22, 23). Another reason why 
Stern’s analysis deviates from a classical optimisation exercise in economics is 
uncertainty. At times Stern built his case on evidence that was not modelled at 
all (see especially chapter 3 of 2). This predominantly concerned the estimation 
of the benefits of emissions reductions (the avoided impacts of climate 
change), where some of the identified risks were so poorly understood that 
they had not been incorporated in the relevant models. Nevertheless, the basic 
logic was to compare costs and benefits and to recommend policies that 
provided net benefits on aggregate (see chapter 13). Indeed, in comparison 
with previous appraisals of emissions targets in the UK (24, 25), the Stern Review 
included explicit monetisation of the benefits of emissions reductions for the 
first time (chapter 6). More generally, CBA as practised by government rarely, 
if ever, resembles the kind of optimisation exercise that some commentators 
had in mind when debating the status of the Stern Review.2 
  
As mentioned, a particular feature of Stern was its emphasis on analysis of, 
and attitudes to, uncertainty. Stern’s main point, that immediate and strong 
reductions in carbon emissions are warranted, was based on reductions in the 
probability of particular temperature changes ‘bought’ by progressively 
tighter climate targets. These probabilities were derived from complex 
climate-modelling exercises (e.g. 26). Similarly, the Review’s attempt to 
estimate the benefits of emissions reductions in money units (chapter six) was 
based on a substantial Monte Carlo simulation procedure, as was its principal 
attempt to estimate costs (27, in chapter 9). 
 
2.2. Deliberation strategy 
                                                 
2 We are grateful to Michael Spackman for this point. 
 We regard both CoRWM and Stern as having a strong deliberative aspect. 
However, they differ both in terms of the internal composition and dynamics of 
the review team and the extent to which they availed themselves of broader 
mechanisms of public and stakeholder engagement.  
 
We deal first with internal composition and dynamics. CoRWM was set up as an 
independent committee outside the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the central-government department with 
responsibility for radioactive waste management policy, and the team had a 
diverse membership, both by discipline (including economics, law, politics, 
and relevant science and engineering disciplines) and by profession 
(including academics, a lawyer, a lay member and a prominent 
environmentalist). This contrasts with a traditional advisory committee, with 
highly focussed and directly relevant expertise. Members of CoRWM were 
senior and in some sense equal in rank; most had several decades of relevant 
experience. While some members had spent a large portion of their working 
lives in the nuclear industry, others were opponents of UK policy, both on 
radioactive waste management and nuclear matters more generally. By 
contrast, the Stern Review was undertaken ‘in-house’ by a team of civil 
servants either directly in the employ of the Treasury or on secondment from 
other central-government departments with a policy interest (e.g. DEFRA, the 
Department for International Development, and the then Department of 
Trade and Industry). The review team sat within the Treasury and 
contributions from independent experts such as academics were invited either 
on an informal, advisory basis or on a consultancy basis. While by all accounts 
the Review was produced by a team, it contrasts with CoRWM in being 
deliberately structured around a significant public figure.  
 
In addition to its status and composition, the two processes differed in terms 
of the use they made of formal public and stakeholder engagement mechanisms. 
External parties were extensively involved in CoRWM’s formulation of the 
problem and in various stages of CoRWM´s decision process from long-listing 
to option assessment, as well as commenting on the recommendations. 
Indeed, both CoRWM’s members and outsiders such as its Independent 
Evaluator regarded its public and stakeholder engagement as ground-
breaking in the UK (28). Central to its engagement were three separate fora for 
ongoing dialogue with external interests: a National Stakeholder Forum of 
various interest groups, which met four times over the course of the review; 
eight Nuclear Site Stakeholder Round Tables comprising stakeholders from 
nuclear communities, which met three times; and four Citizen’s Juries (29, 30), 
which each met three times. CoRWM took particular care to feed its 
deliberations back to these various fora, so that while there was a recognition 
that not everyone would agree with the Committee’s emerging view, there 
was no doubt that all expressed opinions had been considered. This intensive 
engagement exercise was complemented by a broader exercise in 
disseminating information and soliciting views, including the circulation of a 
discussion guide to many hundreds of stakeholder groups across the UK.  
 
The Stern Review on the other hand did not bring external parties into the 
process so formally and so intensively. A call for evidence was opened in 
early October 2005 and was closed by mid January 2006. Shortly afterwards, 
at the Oxford Institute of Economic Policy (‘Oxonia’) Distinguished Lecture in 
Oxford on 31st January 2006, Stern tested out his initial views (31). Many of the 
ultimate findings of the Review were presaged here. Further responses to the 
Oxonia lecture were invited until March. Both prior and subsequent to the 
Oxonia event, Stern and his team also engaged in an extensive programme of 
consultation with academics, policy-makers and non-governmental actors, 
both at home and across many of the countries seen to be important in 
international climate negotiations, such as Brazil, China, India and the United 
States. Yet these were typically one-off and informal, either in the nature of 
fact-finding or of dissemination of emerging conclusions. While views were 
diligently and extensively sought, there was no formal provision for the 
consultees to monitor whether and to what extent their views were impacting 
on decisions, which is the defining characteristic of the ‘consultation’ mode of 
public and stakeholder engagement, as famously set out by Arnstein (32) in her 
‘ladder of citizen participation’. There was little if any engagement with lay 
members of the general public; these myriad consultations tended to be 
restricted to academic and policy networks. This is not to deny that the Stern 
Review process was deliberative. Rather, the point we seek to make is that 
Stern’s public and stakeholder engagement was informal and inward looking 
(towards established nodes of influence in domestic and international climate 
policy), while CoRWM’s was formal and outward looking. 
 
3. WHY DID THE REVIEWS DIFFER? 
 
While there were real and stark differences between the two reviews, we 
would caution the reader against interpreting them as polar opposites. The 
CoRWM members, for example, were very aware that their role was not 
simply to reflect back public opinion, but to take responsibility for 
recommending to government, and the substantial amount of intellectual 
work which CoRWM put in, assembling and cross-checking facts and 
weighting judgement and argument, is evident in their final report, just as 
was the case for Stern. And just as CoRWM was at pains to point out that the 
MCDA – as the decision-analytic literature consistently stresses – was a tool to 
support decision making, not an attempt to automate it, Stern also rejected the 
identity that might be constructed between policy analysis and formal 
modelling, in the conviction that the application of economic tools to policy 
must be done with careful attention to underlying (and often implicit) 
assumptions and value judgements embedded in these tools.  
 
Nevertheless, as we have emphasised above, CoRWM and Stern, despite their 
similarities, differed substantially in terms of both their choice of analytic 
method, as well as their deliberation strategy. To some extent, these choices 
were linked: insofar as Stern is an economic review, it is also technical, 
requiring familiarity with economic theory and methods; CoRWM’s diverse 
team, on the other hand, produced a report which has no specific disciplinary 
allegiance. CBA, although it draws on public values through surveys and 
market studies, is not an instrument for consultation, while MCDA has been 
promoted by opponents of CBA as a form of analysis which is more 
inherently democratic, participative, and multiperspectival (e.g. 33, 34) (while on 
the other hand proponents of CBA sometimes present MCDA as supine or 
vacuous, doing nothing more than reflecting back to decision makers their 
own beliefs.)  
 
We now turn to discussing explanations for the observed differences. In doing 
so, we follow recent contributions to the literature on risk regulation (e.g. 35) 
and on policy appraisal (e.g. 36), which attempt to dig beneath the surface of 
apparently overarching trends in regulation (e.g. 37, 38) to describe and explain 
why in fact the style and stringency of regulation often varies from one risk to 
another. What such contributions have fruitfully asked is whether differences 
in the nature of regulation, including different methods of gathering 
information such as, in our case, different approaches to strategic appraisal, 
are due to differences in the type of risk or differences in the political context, 
such as public opinion and pressure from interest groups. Here we consider 
two aspects of the type of risk to be regulated – (i) the nature of the 
underpinning science of climate change compared with radioactive waste and 
(ii) the scale of the problem – before going on to consider (iii) the political 
context.  
 
3.1. Underpinning science 
 
In both cases there are considerable similarities in the role of the underpinning 
science. For both climate change and radioactive waste, scientists feel that 
much of the basic underlying science is well-understood (the role of 
greenhouse gases has been understood since Tyndall; North (39) remarks that 
“there is nothing unusually mysterious to the trained scientist about nuclear 
energy, ionizing radiation or radioactive isotopes”). This does not, however, 
preclude uncertainty about the performance of particular systems, for 
example the climate system, or the behaviour of radioactive waste under the 
unusual conditions it will encounter in a geological repository, or its 
movement and impacts in the biosphere. In both cases, such evidence as there 
is concerning system behaviour comes from the distant past: in the case of 
radioactive waste the Oklo deposit in Gabon where a naturally occurring 
nuclear reactor left deposits of radioactive nuclides in a geological setting; in 
the case of climate change, much relevant evidence comes from 
palaeoclimatological studies of climate fluctuations. The fact that these events 
are so long in the past contributes to uncertainty, but in both cases the 
uncertainty is compounded by the need to extrapolate to situations which do 
not precisely correspond to any previously experienced. Although radioactive 
wastes will potentially remain hazardous for tens or hundreds of thousands 
of years, this profoundly long timescale is not a feature unique to radioactive 
waste; many of the consequences associated with climate change such as sea-
level rise are also not just long-lasting, but effectively irreversible; 
consequences may be felt not merely for millennia, but forever.  
 
As there appear to be no sharp differences between the role of science per se, 
and as both reviews were scientifically-informed, broadly accepting existing 
consensus science, rather than attempting to commission much in the way of 
further scientific research, we conclude that differences in the science of the 
two issues does not explain the difference in approach of the reviews.  
 
3.2. Scale of the problem 
 
The scale of the problem, in particular how it is reflected in the respective policy 
frameworks, begins to give a better sense of the reasons for the difference in 
approach. Radioactive waste is intrinsically a national problem: countries 
have to manage a stock of radioactive waste produced by activities permitted 
and regulated by (if not actually carried out by) national governments. The 
UK, in common with many other countries, has committed to a policy of self-
sufficiency in the management of Intermediate and High-Level radioactive 
waste, meaning that waste should be managed locally within the UK (40, retrieved 
27/04/09). Indeed, radioactive waste is not only national, it is local, in the sense 
that the waste is produced by a comparatively small set of processes (nuclear 
power, defence, medical and some industrial processes) in comparatively 
small volumes (relative to other material flows), and coupled with the fact 
that the sunk costs of storage/disposal command a relatively high share of the 
total costs, a single community has to be found to “host” the waste. As a 
result, much of the politics of radioactive waste is driven by resistance, or the 
threat or prospect of resistance, from these host communities, and issues of 
equity, justice and procedural fairness loom large (41-44).  
 
Conversely, climate change is a truly global, systemic, and transboundary 
hazard. The effects of greenhouse gases are global, since they are transmitted 
to the regional and local levels through global changes to the climate system. 
At the same time, all nations are responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, 
albeit in different proportions, and in most nations there are numerous 
sources of emissions. It is beyond the ability of any individual nation, even 
the biggest, to unilaterally reduce global emissions to low levels. There is also 
the disincentive to do so arising from the public-good nature of the hazard 
(i.e. other nations can free ride on these efforts). Thus climate change is an 
issue for international collective action, and national-level actions are highly 
contingent on the achievement of an acceptable international agreement. 
Furthermore, the cost structure of options to reduce emissions points to a 
wide portfolio of measures, due to the sheer magnitude of emissions 
reductions that many consider necessary, which ultimately overwhelms the 
economies of scale associated with any one currently practicable measure (e.g. 45, 
46). 
 
These differences in the scale of the issues, summarised in table II, lead us 
directly into the policy context and history. 
 
Table II about here 
 
3.3. Political context 
 
On political context, the issues can also be sharply distinguished (see table III). 
Of course there are again similarities. Both hazards are critically linked with – 
and linked by – energy policy. Roughly one quarter of global greenhouse gas 
emissions comes from the power sector; in the UK it is closer to one third (47). 
Moreover replacing fossil-fuel electricity generation capacity with nuclear 
power is considered by many, including the UK government, to be a 
promising option for reducing emissions. In the UK, there is some urgency 
surrounding energy-supply policy, because a significant portion of the 
country’s current generation capacity will need to be replaced in the coming 
decade or two. In both cases, the issue is contentious, with significant interest 
groups and pressure groups with strong views on either side of the issue. 
 
Table III about here 
 
However, there have been clear differences in the state of, and pressures on, 
UK policy towards radioactive waste, compared with climate change. 
Radioactive waste management has been on the policy agenda for several 
decades and the UK government, through its implementor the Nuclear 
Industry Radioactive Waste Executive (NIREX), has repeatedly tried and 
failed to develop solutions (1, 48). The history of both radioactive waste 
management in particular and nuclear technology in general has left a legacy 
of suspicion and distrust of state- and industry-sponsored actors and 
established science, and their combined ability to deliver solutions in the UK 
and internationally (49-51). While the mainstream scientific community has 
tended to favour geological disposal solutions (or even more politically 
controversial sub-seabed solutions), this has not been a view shared by the 
public at large, or by environmental organisations (for example, the Royal 
Society (52), in its role as the UK national academy of science, noted “We 
conclude that deep geological disposal is the best available long-term option, 
but recognise the fact that this is not yet widely accepted.”). CoRWM was 
initiated against this backdrop, after the NIREX-sponsored programme’s 
application to build an underground laboratory in Cumbria as a prelude to 
the construction of a repository had been rejected by the Secretary of State. At 
this point, the radioactive waste management process in the UK had stalled. 
 
With climate change, the position is quite different. There is by now a high 
degree of consensus on many of the basic features of, and qualitative risks 
presented by, anthropogenic climate change, as is evident in for example the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (53) and in positions taken by national 
academies of science in many countries. The view from the scientific 
community has generally been that action should be taken, and urgently. The 
public seems in agreement with this view: in the run up to the commissioning 
of the Stern Review, public concern in the UK about climate change had risen 
considerably, mainly in response to a sequence of ‘bad news’ about the 
changing climate, as the UK media and public digested new scientific 
observations and interpreted weather events such as flooding and exceptional 
warmth. Thus there was widespread and intensifying support for action on 
climate change in a general sense, which was reflected by a consensus across 
political parties. Yet this rising public concern was not reflected in policy 
measures. In fact the UK had a relatively ambitious long-term unilateral target 
for reductions in carbon dioxide emissions (a 60% cut by 2050), but not only 
was this rather too far off to be credible, it was not matched by the all-
important outcomes of international negotiations (and at that time it was not 
legally binding). Thus the government’s challenge in the run up to the Stern 
Review was not one of overturning public opposition and overcoming 
distrust. 
 
3.4. Weighing up the explanations  
 
The framing of CoRWM’s task reflects the pervasive lack of public trust on the 
nuclear issue. CoRWM’s brief was explicitly “to arrive at recommendations 
which can inspire public confidence and are practicable in securing the long 
term safety of the UK's radioactive wastes”, with the sponsor further noting 
(to eliminate any residual ambiguity) that the Committee “must therefore 
listen to what people say during the course of its work, and address the 
concerns that they raise” (1, Annex 1). This is in line with international good 
practice in radioactive waste management (44); also UK national commentators, 
including those with links to the earlier, failed, NIREX process, have come to 
the view that more transparent, responsive and participatory approaches are 
essential to meaningful progression (48). Yet in the light of the essentially 
national scale of the problem, there was no need to involve and convince an 
international audience. Although CoRWM was chaired by an economist, there 
is little direct evidence of an economic imprint on CoRWM’s report, although 
CoRWM did commission work on the costs of the various options, and 
discusses in the report (p 80) why it did not explicitly deal with cost within 
the MCDA. 
 
In the case of climate change, in the face of a domestic public which shared 
scientists’ concerns, and a sceptical international community which required 
convincing and motivating, the challenge was to garner international support. 
Jordan and Lorenzoni (54, p310) argue persuasively that the Stern Review was 
part of a “much grander geo-strategic plan to convince the rest of the world 
that ‘business as usual’ will eventually lead to unacceptable risks”. Making 
the economic case for action was a pivotal part of this plan. Indeed, the Stern 
Review was commissioned against the backdrop of the so-called ‘Gleneagles 
Dialogue on Climate Change’, conducted under the auspices of the G8 
together with the five leading emerging economies. In this context, we can 
understand the ministerial home of the Stern Review in the UK’s central 
government (i.e. the Treasury, rather than DEFRA), its terms of reference to 
take a global view over the medium- to long-term, and ultimately its choice of 
CBA for the task. The international imperative to conduct an economic 
assessment of climate targets was buttressed by certain domestic political 
dynamics. A report by the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic 
Affairs (55) had been quite critical of the lack of economic evidence used to 
form climate policy in the UK. Partly as a response to this and partly in 
expectation of the likely increasing fiscal importance of climate policy in the 
future, climate change rose up the list of priorities for the Treasury. Without 
the need to win over the domestic public, it is equally clear why much less 
emphasis was placed on public and stakeholder engagement.  
 
Overall we conclude that the differences in approach taken by the two 
reviews are much more obviously explained by political context, and in turn 
by scale, than they are by the scientific nature of the problem: different 
political pressures and imperatives prevailed at the time CoRWM and Stern 
were commissioned; and the constituencies or ‘audiences’ were different. 
Thus CoRWM’s broad-based membership and emphasis on transparency in 
modelling were well suited to a policy problem characterised by a legacy of 
suspicion and distrust. Stern’s technically rich CBA, on the other hand, was 
well suited to a policy problem characterised by a (perceived) lack of 
economic credibility behind ambitious climate targets. 
 
4. SHOULD THE REVIEWS HAVE BEEN LESS DIFFERENT, AND WHAT 
COULD THEY HAVE LEARNED FROM EACH OTHER? 
 
We are left with a more normative question; could and should the two 
reviews have been less different? It is worth highlighting at the outset that 
both reviews were, on the whole, well received. CoRWM’s public and 
stakeholder engagement is regarded as an outstanding achievement by, for 
instance, the Independent Evaluator (28), but its substantive conclusions have 
also been well received by, for instance, the Royal Society (56), and by the 
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (57). The Stern Review’s 
conclusions were also well received in many quarters, with, for instance, an 
impressive range of endorsements published with the book version of the 
review report (2), and the Review has stimulated and focussed public and 
political attention both in the UK and internationally. We personally regard 
both reviews as substantial achievements and “fit for purpose”, although 
acknowledging that our respective roles mean that we may not have been 
entirely unbiased. 
 
Nevertheless, both reviews have generated ongoing controversy. Without 
seeking to canvass all views on the two reports (which would require a paper, 
or perhaps a book, by itself), we focus on two issues of particular interest for 
our current comparison. One is the role of uncertainty and the 
recommendation of an intensified R&D programme in the case of CoRWM. 
The other is the handling of benefits accruing to future generations in the case 
of Stern.  
 
Turning first to uncertainty in radioactive waste management, one reading of 
the case proponents make for geological disposal is that, while neither 
disposal nor storage are risk-free, the probability of any given level of 
environmental degradation is lower under the disposal option than under the 
storage option. Equally, a key question in deciding the form of the waste 
management strategy is the scheduling of events, including the timing and 
conditions under which construction would begin on a repository, and the 
timing and conditions of the closing of the repository. Indeed, it has been 
argued that properly understanding the meaning of the concept of 
retrievability is pivotal in interpreting the feedback from the public and 
stakeholder engagement (58). It follows that the suitability of a particular 
analytic approach rides to a significant extent on its capacity to deal with 
these issues. 
 
In the MCDA, CoRWM’s approach was to try to formalise these aspects of the 
decision problem in criteria, such as “public safety” and “flexibility”. In the 
particular variant of MCDA it used (a multi-attribute value model), 
performance on one criterion was then traded off against performance on the 
other, and so on against performance on a wide range of other criteria. 
Elsewhere, the CoRWM report (chapter 18, p 147) makes an extensive 
qualitative survey of the uncertainties surrounding the options, noting that 
scientists have expressed confidence in geological disposal as a generic 
concept, but also that new uncertainties may arise in moving from a generic 
concept to a specific facility design. It further discusses possible concerns 
about the bias of the same scientific community, due to institutional links to 
the nuclear industry. In the light of this uncertainty, CoRWM made a formal 
recommendation that there should be an “intensified programme of research 
and development into the long-term safety of geological disposal”. However, 
because the report relies heavily on qualitative statements of uncertainty, the 
degree of uncertainty is unclear, as is the extent of the expanded R&D 
programme. The government’s response to the recommendation on R&D is 
equivocal and falls short of committing new money to relevant R&D; 
effectively, the issue is thrown back to the technical establishment, in the 
shape of the regulators and to the Nuclear Decommissioning Agency (59). One 
of the CoRWM members has subsequently expressed his disappointment at 
this aspect of the government’s follow-through (58). 
 
Against this backdrop, we believe that a formal probabilistic modelling 
approach (60), of the sort undertaken by Stern or as exemplified in other 
approaches such as decision trees (61) and real options (62), would have had the 
advantage of making key uncertainties explicit and discussable, and could 
have helped clarify both the meaning of the nature of the solutions on the 
table, in particular with respect to the conditions for undertaking particular 
actions (such as sealing the repository) and expectations about the scope of an 
expanded R&D programme. 
 
For its part, the Stern Review received some heavy criticism from academic 
economists, who took issue with a number of features of the Review’s CBA, 
especially its choice of an unusually low discount rate to compare the future 
benefits of emissions reductions with their present costs (17, 63-66). It is tempting 
to dismiss this debate about discounting as the esoteric preserve of a 
particularly mathematical form of economics, but the debate in fact captures a 
key ethical trade-off between burdens on the present generation and burdens 
on generations in the far-off future. It has long been known that the results of 
a CBA of climate targets are very sensitive to the discount rate (compare 21, 67). 
What many commentators found disappointing about the Stern Review was 
the lack of sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the contingency of the overall 
recommendations on the discount rate (68, 69). Moreover it is doubtful that the 
popular support for strong action on climate change is entirely cognisant of 
this trade-off. 
 
Hence, just as CoRWM could have benefitted from Stern’s explicitly 
probabilistic approach, we consider that Stern could have benefitted from 
CoRWM’s intensive use of public and stakeholder engagement. As Stern 
notes repeatedly, at the core of climate-change policy is an ethical problem. 
We are confident that the public at large do indeed feel a strong sense of 
obligation to future generations; however, Stern did not seek evidence that 
this was the case, nor did they seek to probe exactly what is the nature of that 
obligation. Such an engagement would have given Stern ammunition to deal 
with its critics. Moreover, in times of economic difficulty, a real danger is that 
national publics may lose the will to incur the very concrete costs of action. 
Some level of prior public engagement might well have strengthened public 
resolve to see through the necessary sacrifices – in Yankelovich’s (70) terms, to 
“come to public judgement”, and accept the necessary tradeoffs.  
 
Reflecting on the comparison, we argue that CoRWM could have benefitted 
from some formal uncertainty analysis, just as Stern could have benefitted 
from some extra public engagement – although of course all reviews operate 
within a fixed budget envelope and delivery date and any additional activity 
must be counterbalanced by cuts elsewhere. One possible objection, however, 
is that Stern’s analytic approach and its deliberative strategy were bound up 
together, as were CoRWM’s; and that attempts to be at the same time 
intensely technically analytic and extensively participative are bound to fail. 
Obviously there is an element of truth in this, but we see the challenge for 
future strategic reviews not as deciding where they want to position 
themselves on an analysis-deliberation frontier, but as pushing forward that 
frontier, developing new and better ways to combine analysis and 
deliberation, as both Stern and CoRWM, in their different ways, attempted to 
do.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have attempted a comparison of two quite different strategic 
policy reviews commissioned by the UK government on issues of 
environmental risk. We have expounded the differences in the ways in which 
the two reviews attempted to incorporate both analysis and deliberation in 
their working through of the respective issues. We have explored reasons for 
the differences, and argued that much of the difference can be explained by 
the political context in which the reviews took place, rather than the intrinsic 
nature of the risk decision itself. There is an argument that the subject matter 
and overall context of these reviews is so different that little can be learned 
from the comparison: that we are comparing apples and oranges. We would 
strongly contest this: as we have rehearsed throughout this paper, although 
there are dissimilarities, the similarities between the underlying risk decisions 
are pronounced, making the differences in the analytic and deliberative 
approaches taken, if anything, still more surprising and worthy of comment. 
 
The overarching motivation of this paper is the improvement of risk-related 
decision making, in particular the use of formal techniques such as CBA and 
MCDA. We find it disconcerting that policy reviews in the environmental 
domain should take such dissimilar forms. Ultimately these reviews are 
intended to provide government with a reasoned basis for undertaking 
action. While we recognise that the study methodologies chosen, and the 
mode of presentation of results, will be influenced by political context, we 
would like to feel that there is a core of argumentation underpinning policy 
which is method-independent. Otherwise, the question naturally arises: were 
the conclusions reached determined by the methods used?  
 
This is not to say that different people may not take quite different views on 
the same policy issue. In dealing with complex environmental risks such as 
radioactive waste and climate change there are critical questions of time 
preference, risk attitude, attitude to distributional equity, responsibility to the 
non-human natural world, and confidence in the ability of the scientific 
establishment to deliver reliable predictions. Such questions are inherently 
judgemental. However, the role of methods such as CBA and MCDA should 
be to help decision makers structure and clarify these judgements; as their 
proponents repeatedly stress, they should not make the decision, and insofar 
as key value judgements are implicitly embedded in the methods, they fail. 
 
The general implication of this line of reasoning is that choice of study 
method in such reviews should be, as far as possible, reflective, informed by 
an awareness of a range of methods, and should draw on multiple methods. 
In the specific case of Stern and CoRWM, our conclusion is that the two 
reviews could have learned from each other: some of Stern’s analytic 
approaches, particularly around the explicit handling of uncertainty, could 
profitably have been used to strengthen CoRWM’s case; and some of 
CoRWM’s public and stakeholder engagement would have added robustness 
to Stern’s discussion of the ethics of climate change. Of course, we do not and 
cannot prescribe what form future strategic policy reviews should take, 
recognising that these will be tailored to the needs of the specific context. 
Nevertheless, we hope this paper will provide a framework for thinking 
about the choices which governments make in framing such reviews, and 
review teams in undertaking them. 
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Figure 1. Appraisal of policy problems involving decision under risk. 
Choices in appraisal, and factors influencing those choices. 
 
Table I. Differences between CoRWM and Stern. 
 CoRWM Stern 
Analytic approach Multi-Criteria Decision 
Analysis – scoring and 
weighting of options, 
structured around 
stakeholder participation 
Cost-Benefit Analysis – 
extensive technical modelling 
to enable Stern to make 
comparison of costs and 
benefits under uncertainty 
Deliberation 
strategy – 
internal 
composition and 
dynamics 
Independent committee; 
diverse membership 
including both insiders 
and outsiders 
Undertaken within a 
government department; led 
by senior civil servant from 
that department, supported 
by a team of more junior civil 
servants 
Deliberation 
strategy – public 
and stakeholder 
engagement 
Extensive arrangements 
for deliberation 
throughout process; focus 
on civil society 
Standard, ‘light-touch’ 
consultation (publish 
consultation document – 
invite responses); focus on 
national and international 
policy networks 
 
Problem scale 
Choice of analytic approach 
Choices of deliberative strategy 
Underpinning 
science 
Policy context 
and history 
Table II. Differences in the scale of the radioactive waste and climate 
change problems. 
 Radioactive Waste Management Climate Change 
Scale and 
international-
isation 
Nation states manage own waste – 
host community required to 
shoulder the burden 
Transboundary in causes and 
consequences – impacts spread 
across many social groups 
Cost structure 
of solutions 
Small number of management 
strategies 
Many, diffuse solutions  
 
Table III. Differences in the policy context upon commissioning of 
CoRWM and the Stern Review. 
 Radioactive Waste Management Climate Change 
Public attitudes Nuclear industry has 
longstanding public-relations 
problems 
Goodwill towards action but 
public resolve untested 
Policy situation National policy process stalled 
by failure of ‘decide, announce, 
defend’ 
International community 
(G8(+5)) unconvinced of the 
economic case for action 
 
 
 
